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presented m an earher study I partlclpated m at Harvard's Kennedy School of GoLemment 3 In 1992, I argued that President Bush's IYSS made for poor strategy My thesis was that the fdocument's shortcommgs were dictated by the process that produced It
Has this President learned from the nustakes of his predecessor? Has he configured his strategy-makmg process m a way that ~~1111 place the ship of state on a course headed fax mto the twenty-first century~ In this paper, I will cnucally assess the Clmton Admmlstratlon's latest NSS and Its process, and offer a procedural altematlke that may improve future submlsslons On Strategv Strateg) 1s a design for relating means to ends 4 IV'auonal security strategy 1s a nation's design for relatmg the resources at 11s disposal--the Instruments of natlonal power--to the securmg of Its Interests These simple defmltlons tend to obscure the complex challenges facing n I today's \\ ould-be straleglsts Some commentators on the subject. Samuel Huntmgton and Edward Luttwak among them, suggest the challenges to be beyond the capacity of the Amencan statesman Huntmgton claims that the notlon that the United States could produce national strategy 1s nothmg more than a chlmera 5 Luttwak agrees, descnbmg strategic thmkmg as 3 Michael Landrum, Joseph Corcoran, Richard White. and Chnstopher -McSamara, Making: National Secuntv Strategy Process. Paralvsls, and a Xew Path [Cambridge, 11.4 Fatlonal Secunty Program Dlscusslon Paper Senes 92-04, John F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Umverslty, 1992) 4 Adrmral James D Watkins, "The Mantime Strategy," C S Saval Institute's Proceedmgs, Special Supplement, 1986, preface 5 Samuel P Huntington, "The Evolution of U S National Strategy," U S Xatlonal Stratesv for the 1990's, ed Dame1 J Kaufman (Baltimore and London Johns Hopkms Uruversxy Press, 1991: 11-18 armthetxcal to the Amencan cultural tradltlon of pragmatic, short-term problem soivmg 6 There IS evidence to the contrary NSC 68, the document which codified the ends and means of the Cold War, 1s considered by some a masterplece of national strategy And since 1986, we hake produced rune versions of the Katlonal Securltv Strateov of the Umted States So, why the skeptlclsm of Huntington and Luttwakv First, good strategy 1s hard to do A design for relatmg national means to national ends must be complex and richly textured The strategy's complexity IS determmed by two factors the number and compahblllty of the objectives, and the environment wlthm which the strategy will be executed
The declslon to take a strategic approach implies a rational effort to apply hrmted resources to achieve a set of obJectl\es The strategic approach forces choice The strategist must choose those obJectIves that are worth the expenditure of hrmted resource&-he must
The emlronment of a natlonal securrb strategy also dictates Its complexity It includes domestlc and mtematlonal dlmenslons It 1s populated by threats to national Interests, competmon for fmlte resources, and the resources themselves, mcludmg the talents, needs, and potential of the Amencan people The envu-onment IS dynarmc, It changes o\ er time and u arrants constant measurement Threats can wax or wane, the charactens-lcs of the constltuencles to which the national leader IS tied can shift Witness our own era, it would be difficult to fmd another 10 year period of relative peace during which the strategic environment changed so dramaucaIly 6 Edward _U Luttwak, On the Meanmg of Vlctorv, (Tew York Slmon Hill, 1982) What Presxdent m a fast-paced, media-onented world wants to articulate, m a static, lxntten report . a detaled statement of hs forward-lookmg strategic vIslon7 If there was eter a sure-fired means of ensunng that your boss uould be "hoisted on his own petard", this was it To influence resource allocations, It has considered far better to report "Globaloney" to Congress lo Admittedly, the KSS 1s and must be a polltlcal document But. 1s there another reason for In both years, unanimous concurrence was achieved on the first clrculatlon The President offered no guidance to and engaged m no dialogue with his strategists In fact, the "strategists" were staff members chosen for their posmons to perform other tasks, based on crltena appropriate to those pnmary tasks They \%ere not selected for thex skills as strategic thinkers (that at least one of those mtervleu ed 1s a most proflclent strategist 1s only serendlpltous ) At no pomt m the development of either NSS 91 or 96 did any Individual or group of participants engage m a net assessment of the geopolmcal situation A strategic approach implies that strateg guides resource allocation decisions If declslons are to be go\ emed by a bigger pxture than a mosaic created by narrowly focused interest groups, tnen the debate must be framed by a strategy This argues for a carefully crafted strategy-malung process If one studies successful strategies of the past, like KSC 68, and the corporate world's approach to strategic planning, several important prmclples emerge that rmght guide the development of an effective process + Strategy lasts, so _vou better do it well This poses an important paradox Strategy 1s really no more than a desqn for dealmg W&I an uncertam and changing environment, no srrategy should be carted m gramte Yet history tells us that, once committed to a strategy, nations generally stick with It until a catalytic event occurs This IS true whether the strategy IS formally adopted, as was NSC 68, or tacitly accepted, as was lsolatlomsm m the aftermath of . the First World War Thrs principle argues for selectmg the best and the brightest to wnte the strategy, men and women with little or no mstrtutlonal loyaltles, a group capable of grasping the big picture and glvmg It hlstoncal perspective + A dynamic envuonment demands pennanent process Strategies devised by governments last mosti! because of mstltutlonal resistance to change Short of preclpltatmg catalytic events.
the solution requires an mstltutlonal adjustment, one Intended to recognrze the need for, and then to foster. change This 1s the corporate approach to strategy developed by such compames as Hewlett-Packard Care must be taken. however, to change occasionally the population of the process, to Infuse the best and brightest with fresh faces + The leader must "own " the strategy A national strategy IS going to be closely ldennfled \+tth the President He must, therefore, be directly mkolved at kej points m the process He must engage m face-to-face dialogue ulth the strategists m de\ eloping a strategic vlslon which u 111 ,-thematlcally dnle the design He must then officrallq promulgate the strategy m wntmg The process should commit the President to somethmg that reflects his thmkmg, not JUS-that of his strategists An offlclal strategy cornnutted to wntmg provides the bureaucracy wit.1 somethmg on which It can take action + Strategists need the freedom to be wrong Strategy development IS not a science The complexity and dynarmsm of the environment argue for a cychc process, one that routinely assesses the effectiveness of the orlgmal product Strategists need to know that their product will not lead the natlon down a path from which there IS no recourse The unfortunate alternatlve IS a short-sighted, narrowly focused product Likewise, the President needs to provide his strategists with reasonable msulatlon from various interest groups ti lth a stake m , .
the final slape of the strategy If pressure IS brought to bear to satisfy each of these groups, the result will be a non-actlonable document wlthout a prlorltlzed scheme of natlonal interests --much like MS 96
Can we create a better strategy by employmg these prmclples, one that ~111 better serve the President and the nation? I believe we can A Better Wav The SDS, on the other hand, 1s needed to ensure that the Strategy, once promulgated IS being executed It should also serve the President as the agent of change, that is, educate other agencies about the strategy and its intended lmphcatlons The SDS could advise other agencies on ho\\ to act strategically as an orgamzatlonal unit wlthm the framework of the natlonal strategy
The size of both groups 1s small by usual standards for a task of this breadth and Import, and ~lth good reason If partxlpants of the desired caliber and stature are to be attracted, they must be assured that then input will be a substantial factor A common-sense test was also applied to the size, the group should be able to uork comfortably around a conference The Strategy m its early draft stages must be closely held so that the President, his strategists, and the congressional leadershrp will be free to discuss potentially controversial means for securing natlonal interests wlthout fear of stlrrmg public anxiety about, for example, the future of various entitlement programs The Strategy, after all, IS supposed to be an expresslon of presidential leadershlp, not a reflection of every pubhc preference The Strategy should not be subjected to potential partisan or media sabotage until It has extracted the full benefit of the entire process. FVe cannot stop the march of time and events, but the strategy's capacity to lend order to a noisy debate rests m Its creation m a forum removed from the dm
Conclusion
Even the best navigator, wleldmg a finely tuned sextant or the latest m nautical electromcs, can report to the Captain only on where he has been, on ground already traveled The true seaman apphes his hard earned skills to the proJectIon of where he will be and to actions that will headed and how it ~111 get there He could do so unconstrained by concerns 1~ lth re-election He can do so on11 by modlfymg the process I do not contend that the relatlonshlp between process and strategy IS that of a simple "if A. then B" proposltlon configure the right process and effective strategy LX 111 emerge That proposmon ignores factors of motlvatlon, will, and polmcs The perfect process R 111 not achieve success unless the leader recogmzes the need for a strategic approach and perceives that need to be sufflclently urgent to warrant cooptmg or compellmg those elements of the orgamzatlon that are not convinced by the merits of the strategic argument The best we can work touard 1s a procedural framework that maxlmlzes the opportunity for success 15
